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0 Abstract 
The standard formulation of  Newcomb's problem compares evidential and causal conceptions of 
expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer. Thus, in a 
world in which agents face Newcomb problems, the evidential decision theorist might ask the causal 
decision theorist: "if  you're so smart, why ain’cha rich?” Ultimately, however, the expected riches of 
evidential decision theorists in Newcomb problems do not vindicate their theory, because their success 
does not generalize. Consider a theory that allows the agents who employ it to end up rich in worlds 
containing Newcomb problems and continues to outperform in other cases. This type of  theory, which I 
call a “success-first” decision theory, is motivated by the desire to draw a tighter connection between 
rationality and success, rather than to support any particular account of  expected utility. The primary aim 
of  this paper is to provide a comprehensive justification of  success-first decision theories as accounts of 
rational decision. I locate this justification in an experimental approach to decision theory supported by the 
aims of  methodological naturalism. 
 
1 Introduction 
The classic formulation of  Newcomb’s problem is often thought to compare evidential and causal conceptions 
of  expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer than those 
maximizing causal expected utility. Thus, in a world in which agents face classic Newcomb problems, the 
evidential decision theorist might ask the causal decision theorist: “if  you’re so smart, why ain’cha rich?” 
Ultimately, however, the expected riches of  evidential decision theorists do not vindicate their theory, because 
their success does not generalize. For example, in a world in which agents face “transparent” variants of  
Newcomb’s problem, where the contents of  both boxes are revealed before a choice must be made, both causal 
and evidential decision theorists tend to end up poor.1 Thus, in such a world, those following some other theory 
could ask of  both causal and evidential decision theorists “why ain’cha rich?” 
Consider a theory that allows the agents who employ it to end up rich in worlds containing both classic and 
transparent Newcomb problems. This type of  theory is motivated by the desire to draw a tighter connection 
between rationality and success, rather than to support any particular account of  expected utility. We might refer 
to this type of  theory as a “success-first” decision theory. The main aim of  this paper is to provide a 
comprehensive metatheoretical justification of  success-first decision theories as accounts of  rational decision . 
The desire to create a closer connection between rationality and success than that offered by standard 
decision theory has inspired several success-first decision theories over the past three decades, including those 
                                                             
1The transparent Newcomb problem is discussed in Gibbard and Harper, 1981, 181–2. For further examples 
of  a why-ain’cha-rich objection lodged against EDT, see Arntzenius, 2008, 289–90 and Soares and 
Fallenstein, 2015, 2–3. See Lewis, 1981b and Joyce, 1999, 151–4 for other types of  responses to the why-
ain’cha-rich objection on behalf  of  CDT. 
of  Gauthier [1986], McClennen [1990], and Meacham [2010], as well as an influential account of  the rationality 
of  intention formation and retention in the work of  Bratman [1999]. McClennen [1990, 118] writes: “This is a 
brief  for rationality as a positive capacity, not a liability—as it must be on the standard account.” Meacham 
[2010, 56] offers the plausible principle “If  we expect the agents who employ one decision making theory to 
generally be richer than the agents who employ some other decision making theory, this seems to be a prima 
facie reason to favor the first theory over the second.” And Gauthier [1986, 182–3] proposes that “a [decision-
making] disposition is rational if  and only if  an actor holding it can expect his choices to yield no less utility 
than the choices he would make were he to hold any alternative disposition.” In slogan form, Gauthier [1986, 
187] calls the idea “utility-maximization at the level of  dispositions,” Meacham [2010, 68–9] a “cohesive” 
decision theory, McClennen [1990, 6–13] a form of  “pragmatism,” and Bratman [1999, 66] a “broadly 
consequentialist justification” of  rational norms. 
Even though these metatheoretical views have some initial plausibility, they have not been rigorously 
developed past the slogans (the object-level theories, which I evaluate in Section 3.3, are much more developed), 
and it is partly for this reason that many theorists working on practical rationality view success-first decision 
theories with deep suspicion. In Section 2, I provide a comprehensive metatheory for success-first decision 
theories, which I locate inside an experimental approach to decision theory. The experimental approach helps reveal 
what the why-ain’cha-rich objection is really getting at, and it provides a guiding light for success-first decision 
theory. I show that the  approach is compatible with the general ambitions of  both CDT and EDT, although 
here my primary focus is on the causalist. The experimental approach diverges from the standard methodology 
of  CDT by suggesting that experiments, rather than mathematical axiom systems, are the proper tool for 
studying causal efficacy. 
In Section 3, I outline the sort of  object-level theories that follow from the experimental approach. For the 
causal experimentalist, the difference between one- and two-boxing in Newcomb’s problem is not that between 
maximizing causal and evidential expected utility, but rather that between acts and decision theories serving as the 
independent variable of  the experiment. 
 
2 The Experimental Approach to Decision Theory 
Decision theory is concerned with instrumental rationality: the rationality of  instrumental aims. As such, it is 
not concerned with the rationality of  ultimate aims. Many decision theorists point out that decision theory is 
relevant to all forms of  decision making: not just in prudential contexts, but in moral contexts as well, precisely 
because decision theory is not concerned with ultimate aims. 
Accordingly, the decision theorist’s job is like that of  an engineer in inventing decision theories, and like that 
of  a scientist in testing their efficacy. A decision theorist attempts to discover decision theories (or decision 
“rules,” “algorithms,” or “processes”) and determine their efficacy, under certain idealizing conditions, in 
bringing about what is of  ultimate value. 
Someone who holds this view might be called a methodological hypernaturalist, who recommends an experimental 
approach to decision theory.2 On this view, the decision theorist is a scientist of  a special sort, but their goal should 
be broadly continuous with that of  scientific research. The goal of  determining efficacy in bringing about value, 
for example, is like that of  a pharmaceutical scientist attempting to discover the efficacy of  medications in 
treating disease. 
                                                             
2“Hyper” because many decision theorists think of  themselves as methodological naturalists but do not 
subscribe to the experimental approach, often due to concerns that I allay in Section 2.2. 
For game theory, Thomas Schelling [1960] was a proponent of  this view. The experimental approach is 
similar to what Schelling meant when he called for “a reorientation of  game theory” in Part 2 of  A Strategy of  
Conflict. Schelling argues that a tendency to focus on first principles, rather than upshots, makes game-theoretic 
theorizing shockingly blind to rational strategies in coordination problems. A simple example asks respondents 
to name “heads” or “tails” with the understanding that if  a partner in another room does the same they both 
receive a prize [Schelling, 1960, 56]. Since the heads-heads and tails-tails outcomes are both in equilibrium and 
Pareto-optimal, the game-theoretic answer is that agents should pick a response at random. This strategy secures 
the prize half  of  the time. But respondents tend to do much better than that. A large majority of  respondents 
choose heads [Mehta et al., 1994]. Schelling explains that “heads” represents a point of  convergence of  
expectations for most people, which he calls a “focal point.”3 He introduces many examples to show that 
attention to focal points is a valuable tool for coordinating, bargaining, and deterring. Focal points, however, 
have received little attention from game theorists.4 
Focal points would not disappear under idealization, and so cannot be dismissed as concerning non-ideal 
theory. Rather, the lack of  attention to focal points is due to the difficulty in deriving a systematic theory of  
their use from axioms of  rational choice. In contrast, Schelling imposes no such restriction on how a theory is 
derived. Instead, he commits to finding the best theory by induction from its success. Referring to coordination 
games like “heads/tails,” Schelling [1960, 283–4, emphasis added] writes that his basic premise is that rational 
players realize “that some rule must be used if  success is to exceed coincidence, and that the best rule to be 
found, whatever its rationalization, is consequently a rational rule.” 
The experimental approach to decision theory departs from standard methodology in the way imagined by 
Schelling. Rather than attempting to justify theories through deduction from a priori axioms, the main 
justification lies in the results. Only after expected results are determined should foundations be inferred. To 
borrow from William James [1896, 726]: the strength of  the standard decision theorist’s system “lies in the 
principles, the origin, the terminus a quo of  his thought; for us the strength is in the outcome, the upshot, the 
terminus ad quem. Not where it comes from but what it leads to is to decide.”5 
 
2.1 Experiments 
The best metatheory for success-first decision theories develops Schelling’s insights into a rigorous experimental 
approach. First, note how experiments in decision theory differ from those of  other scientists. The decision 
theorist uses thought experiments, not concrete experiments, and they determine the efficacy of  decisions or 
decision theories from the specification of  problems, rather than through controlled trials. 
These methodological differences owe to decision theory’s  goal of  instrumental value-maximization across 
possible worlds. In comparison, the goal of  treating a disease as it actually exists, for example, is severely 
circumscribed. Nevertheless, in each instance the function of  thought experiments and concrete experiments is 
the same. In empirical science, experiments and thought experiments share a functional description [El Skaf  
and Imbert, 2013]. 
An experiment aims to investigate how a dependent variable depends on an independent variable. For example, a 
research pharmacist attempts to discover medications (independent variable) and determine their efficacy in 
                                                             
3In another famous example, Schelling asked respondents to pick a time and place to meet a partner in New 
York City without prior communication. Most respondents selected Grand Central Station at noon 
[Schelling, 1960, 55–6]. 
4Exceptions include Sugden, 1995 and Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006. 
5Quoted in Sugden and Zamarrón 2006, 620. 
treating disease (dependent variable). This requires careful use of  controls that help isolate effects of  the 
independent variable from others. It is not the role of  the pharmacist to define  “disease” and  “cure,” or even  
“therapeutic effect” and “adverse effect.” Rather, the pharmacist is in the first place simply interested in 
determining  effects of  a treatment. 
The same should hold of  decision theory. As decision theory concerns instrumental rationality, it is not the 
place of  the decision theorist to determine which states of  the world are better than others. Rather, the decision 
theorist studies the efficacy of  an action or decision theory (independent variable) in bringing about states of  
affairs (dependent variable). The value of  these states is often taken as determined by the agent’s preferences; 
however, in line with the idea that decision theory concerns all forms of  decision making, values can be 
determined in many ways. The idealizations (in idealized decision theory) act to isolate effects of  the 
independent variable from others, like an agent’s belief  accuracy or cognitive abilities. 
Consider James Joyce’s [1999, 146–7] fascinating description of  Newcomb’s problem: 
Suppose there is a brilliant (and very rich) psychologist who knows you so well that he can predict 
your choices with a high degree of  accuracy. One Monday as you are on the way to the bank he 
stops you, holds out a thousand-dollar bill, and says: “You may take this if  you like, but I must 
warn you that there is a catch. This past Friday I made a prediction about what your decision would 
be. I deposited $1,000,000 into your bank account on that day if  I thought you would refuse my 
offer, but I deposited nothing if  I thought you would accept.6 
In Nozick’s [1969, 114–5] classic formulation, the bank account is an opaque box and the money is in a 
transparent box. Joyce’s otherwise equivalent formulation does an excellent job of  highlighting the causal 
inefficacy of  refusing the thousand dollars. 
When determining causal efficacy under the experimental approach, there is a choice regarding the 
independent variable, and this is best highlighted by Newcomb’s problem. As Joyce’s formulation reveals, if  we 
set the independent variable to acts, then the causally efficacious option is to accept the thousand. We deduce, 
using causal dominance, that the effect of  accepting (i.e., “two-boxing”) is to leave you a thousand richer than 
you would be had you chosen the other option. The good thing about causal dominance arguments is that they 
leave no room for doubt. If  we set up this experiment and controlled for variables that are causally independent 
of  acts, we would observe that everyone who accepts the thousand gets a thousand more than they would have 
had they chosen the other option . This all follows from the specification of  the case.7 
The story about causal efficacy remains the same in the transparent Newcomb problem.8 Suppose the 
psychologist informs his potential beneficiaries whether the money has been deposited before they decide, and 
                                                             
6Adapted from a version presented by Sobel [1985, 198–9 n. 6]. Sobel points out that the classic formulation 
of  Newcomb’s problem can lead to confusions that make one-boxing seem more appealing. 
7Dominance arguments only apply if  the states are independent of  the available acts. Causal decision theorists 
hold that this is satisfied when the states are causally independent of  the acts, as in Newcomb’s Problem. 
Evidential decision theorists, however, require evidential independence of  the acts, and therefore reject 
dominance reasoning in Newcomb’s problem (see Joyce, 1999, 150–1). See footnote 10 for a type of  
dominance argument that is compatible with success-first decision theories. 
8Gibbard and Harper [1981, 181] write: “Consider a variant on Newcomb’s story: the subject of  the 
experiment is to take the contents of  the opaque box first and learn what it is; he then may choose either 
to take the thousand dollars in the second box or not to take it.” Note that in their discussions of  the 
transparent Newcomb problem, Broome [2001, 101], Gauthier [1986, 157–89], and Parfit [1984, 7] all use 
“transparency” to denote the fact that the agent can be predicted, and not the fact that the agent can see 
into the boxes.. 
as before, that he is an accurate predictor. Again, causal dominance applies. There are two possible conditions: 
you learn that the money has been deposited or it has not. In both conditions, you receive a thousand more by 
accepting than you would by refusing. This is what we would observe were we to set up the experiment and 
control for irrelevant factors. Thus, when studying causal act efficacy with the experimental approach, two-
boxing is most efficacious in classic and transparent Newcomb problems. 
An experimental rationale can also be given for the split recommendations of  evidential decision theorists 
who favor one-boxing in the classic Newcomb problem but two-boxing in the transparent version. Rather than 
determining an act’s causal efficacy, experiments can determine an act’s “foreseeable actual expected return” 
[Ahmed, 2014b, 182, fn. 34]. To determine that, the relevant experiment would observe the average return of  
one- and two-boxing while controlling only for variables that are evidentially independent of  the act (most 
importantly, the prediction is left uncontrolled). Since the predictor is accurate, these experiments would show 
a greater average return for one-boxing. Such an experiment would be “nonstandard” in that it would aim to 
establish correlation, rather than a causal relationship. However, this is unlikely to trouble evidential decision 
theorists, who are already committed to the idea that rational decisions are not determined by causal 
relationships.9 
Two possibilities remain: a recommendation to two-box in the transparent version but one-box in the classic 
version, and a recommendation to one-box in both. I know of  no experimental rationale for the former, but 
the key, I believe, to understanding the motivation behind the latter is to recognize the impulse to study the 
causal efficacy of  decision theories rather than acts.10 Understood this way, the experiment should not test the 
effects of  the act of  one-boxing, as when studying act-efficacy, but rather of  employing a decision-making 
theory that recommends one-boxing. Thus, we set the independent variable to decision theories, not acts, and 
imagine experiments that isolate the causal consequences of  decision theories. That changes the story about 
who tends to end up with more money. As is assumed in the literature, those who employ a decision-making 
theory that recommends one-boxing tend to get a million, while those who employ a theory that recommends 
two-boxing tend to get a thousand. This follows from the specification of  the case—what it means for a 
predictor to be “accurate” etc. Furthermore, these effects can be observed, in principle, in the same way that 
the effects of  the different acts can be observed: by controlling for causally independent factors, applying 
accurate predictions to each type of  agent, and noting the differences in wealth that result.11 
                                                             
9What can be said against the evidential experimental approach? From my perspective, the largest hurdles are 
i) the intuition that rational decision making is a subjunctive endeavor in which the relevant considerations 
concern causal properties [Joyce, 1999, 252–3], and ii) the concern that this will result in a “one-box” 
recommendation for medical Newcomb problems (see Section 2.3.1). Whether (ii) is a problem depends 
on whether there exists a sound version of  the “tickle defense” argument (See Ahmed, 2014b, 91–7 for a 
recent example and further references). 
10A type of  dominance argument that is compatible with one-boxing in both versions is the “principle of  full 
information” endorsed by Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve [2013, 114]: “When one lacks information, but can 
infer that there is a particular alternative one would invariably regard as best if  one had full information, 
then one should choose this alternative.” This principle, when combined with the requirement of  causal 
act-state independence, would merely require that a theory give the same recommendation in both classic 
and transparent Newcomb problems. 
11If  one does not understand this motivation, and views act-efficacy as the only possible option for evaluating 
rationality of  decision making, then one is likely to be befuddled by the many seemingly intelligent people 
working in fields related to artificial intelligence who view one-boxing in the transparent Newcomb 
problem as rational. Arntzenius [2008, 290], for example, calls these people “insane.” (The same applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to those befuddled by the many seemingly intelligent philosophers who view two-boxing 
Thus, from the causal experimentalist perspective, disagreement over Newcomb’s problem is best attributed 
to disagreement over the appropriate independent variable, and not over the appropriate conception of  
expected utility. In fact, from that perspective, casting Newcomb’s problem as a disagreement over expected 
utility is a needless distraction. Endorsement of  one-boxing is compatible with the general motivations of  CDT 
and the use of  causal notions to define expected utilities. 
 
2.2 The Epistemic Problem with the Experimental Approach 
The above might strike many as a nice idea, but unworkable as we move to more complex cases involving 
epistemic uncertainty. The problem is this. Most decision theorists believe that decision situations are defined 
by an agent’s epistemic perspective, not the agent’s actual situation. (This is the analog, in decision theory, of  
the idea that practical rationality concerns a “subjective ought,” on which what an agent ought to do depends 
on what the agent believes, not what the world is actually like). However, the experimental approach may seem 
compatible only with a more “objective” conception of  decision situations, 12  since it is unclear how to 
experiment with an epistemic perspective. So, the experimental approach might seem hopeless as an account of  
subjective rationality. 
This is the largest obstacle to the experimental approach, and one main reason knowledgeable theorists 
remain skeptical of  success-first decision theories. Thus, the justification for the experimental approach or 
success-first decision theories will never be complete without a proper specification of  the connection between an 
agent’s epistemic perspective and the conditions by which the agent succeeds or fails. 
The solution lies in an “experimental resolution” of  the epistemic perspective. To create an experimental 
resolution, take a description of  the agent’s epistemic perspective, including probabilities, causal dependency 
hypotheses, etc.; in short, everything that is relevant to the decision situation. The idealized experimental resolution 
of  the case is a specification of  a situation that eliminates the effects of  inaccuracies in the agent’s epistemic 
perspective. Using this, we deduce the effects of  the independent variable on average success and failure. 
Some theorists will, of  course, disagree about which epistemic factors are relevant to the decision situation. 
The experimental approach is neutral between these different conceptions. It only suggests that, for any 
proposed decision situation, the description be made detailed enough (if  possible) to allow for experimental 
resolution. 
In step form: 
 
1. The case should describe in as much detail as necessary the agent’s epistemic perspective. 
2. Form an idealized experimental resolution of  the case, controlling for the effects of  inaccuracies or 
limitations in the agent’s epistemic perspective. 
3. Deduce the averages of  good and bad states for different decisions or decision makers under the 
experimental resolution. 
This process is not as revisionary as it may seem. Theorists have long been forming idealized experimental 
resolutions of  decision problems and making claims about them. Consider the orthodox claim that one-boxers 
tend to be richer than two-boxers. In descriptions of  Newcomb’s problem, the predictor is often called 
“accurate,” “reliable,” or similar. If  these terms are meant to describe the agent’s epistemic perspective and not 
                                                             
in the classic Newcomb problem as rational.) 
12See Mellor, 1991 for a defense of  “objective decision theory.” 
the actual situation, then the inference from the description to one-boxers’ success is obviously invalid. Here 
Nozick’s [1969, 114, emphasis added] original presentation of  the case is particularly apt. He writes: “Suppose 
a being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence” and “One might tell a longer 
story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being’s prediction about your choice in the situation 
to be discussed will be correct.” Notice that we cannot directly infer any actual average monetary payouts from 
this description. 
When theorists describe the average success of  one- and two-boxers, therefore, these claims must concern 
an idealized experimental resolution of  Nozick’s description, which controls for effects of  belief  inaccuracy. 
Here is one such. To call the predictor reliable is exactly to say that there is a high chance of  it predicting 
one/two-boxing in situations where one/two-boxing in fact occurs.13 Under this assumption, the idealized 
experimental resolution demands a high chance of  a one-box prediction given that one-boxing occurs, and a 
high chance of  a two-box prediction given that two-boxing occurs. So, in the resolution, one-boxers tend to get 
a million dollars while two-boxers tend to get only a thousand (two-boxers do not always end up poorer, of  
course, and that is why the focus is on average payout across repeated hypothetical experiments, as in Step 3 
above). The nature of  the chances need not be metaphysically loaded: it could simply be a high hypothetical 
relative frequency of  correct predictions. Something like this is necessary to make sense of  the orthodox claim 
that one-boxers tend to be richer than two-boxers. 
Can we always form experimental resolutions of  well-formed decision problems? My main reply is that, 
ultimately, it does not matter. But let me first introduce the reasons for optimism about forming experimental 
resolutions 
Causal decision theorists share a common idea, and differ mostly on emphasis [Lewis, 1981a, 5]. Some, for 
example, emphasize chances in their formulations, and some counterfactual conditionals. But these are 
interrelated and, on some views, interdefinable. The idea that causal decision theorists share is that the agent’s 
epistemic perspective yields a causal story that must be respected when determining rational decisions. This 
story is often called a “dependency hypothesis.” Dependency hypotheses are formulated in various ways, but all 
involve the possibility of  constructing an experimental resolution from the story. 
For example, the experimental approach is particularly friendly to “chance” readings of  dependency 
hypotheses as maximally detailed specifications of  conditional chances. 14  For objectivists, these comprise 
propositions that do not vary from person to person, while for subjectivists, they are based on an agent’s estimation 
of  chances. Either way, we can create an idealized experimental resolution of  the agent’s decision situation by 
assuming that the conditions determining the agent’s actual payout match the conditional chances under the 
agent’s dependency hypothesis. 
We can also formulate experimental resolutions using the counterfactual dependence version. At first glance, 
creating a usable experimental resolution from counterfactual conditionals may seem a challenge, since the 
relevant chances, which are required to calculate the averages of  the states obtaining, are not supplied directly 
by the agent’s epistemic perspective but must be inferred from credences over counterfactuals. These inferences 
can seem especially difficult if  the agent’s credences are divided over conflicting counterfactuals. Nevertheless, 
epistemologists are doing promising research on the connection between credence and objective chance. Hájek 
[manuscript] suggests that credence “aligns with the truth” to the extent that it matches objective chances, and 
Mellor [1991, 274] proposes something similar. Other theories focus on when a credence is justified. Following 
Hájek and Mellor, perhaps a justified credence is one that matches or nearly matches objective chance, or is 
                                                             
13Cf. Joyce, 170, fn. 36. 
14See Joyce, 1999, 166–7 for discussion. 
produced by a process that produces a high proportion of  credences nearly matching objective chances. 
Following van Fraassen [1983, 1984] and Lange [1999], perhaps a justified credence is one that is the output of  
a process that is calibrated; i.e., a process that produces credences that match actual or potential frequencies. Or 
perhaps, as Tang [2016] suggests, expanding on Alston [1988, 2005], a justified credence is one that is based on 
some ground, where the objective probability of  the credence having true content given that it is based on that 
ground matches the credence. 15  In each instance, we have a general formula for creating experimental 
resolutions: stipulate that the agent’s credences are justified or at least align with the truth, and so match objective 
chances. 
Even if  one does not accept these theories of  the justification of  credences—for example, one prefers the 
concept of  accuracy16—they can generate idealized experimental resolutions. The important point is that an 
agent’s credences over propositions can be used in an idealized experimental resolution by stipulating that they 
match objective chances. 
Now the main point. Inability to construct idealized experimental resolutions of  certain decision problems 
should not affect our evaluation of  problems where it is possible to construct such a resolution. This is 
analogous to a common observation regarding decision making under risk (where probabilities are known) 
versus decision making under ignorance (where they are not). Even if  one accepts a principle for decision 
making under ignorance, such as minimax regret, one should not insist on it when probabilities are known. 
(Rather, in those cases one should maximize expected utility.) Similarly for experimental resolutions: when an 
experimental resolution can be formed, there is no need to apply principles meant to deal with cases in which it 
cannot. 
Furthermore, just as some believe that supposed decisions under ignorance can always be transformed into 
decisions under risk—perhaps via a principle of  indifference—some may believe that one can always create 
experimental resolutions from well-formed decision problems. Others may believe that it is not always possible. 
An experimentalist about decision theory need not take a stand on this.17 
                                                             
15 Beebee and Papineau [1997] make a similar proposal. 
16See Joyce, 1998. Also see Tang, 2016, 74–6 for objections to this view. 
17Examples of  decision problems where it is difficult to construct idealized experimental resolutions suitable 
for studying act-efficacy involve causal unratifiability. For example, in Gibbard and Harper’s [1981, 185–6] 
Death in Damascus, rational deliberation results in shifting calculations of  the causal consequences of  each 
act, and thus shifting idealized experimental resolutions of  the decision problem. The same is true in 
“asymmetric” variants of  Death in Damascus, in which one location is more pleasant than the other. (See 
also Egan’s [2007] Psychopath Button. Interestingly, the suggestion that such cases lack an idealized 
experimental resolution suitable for studying act-efficacy supports Joyce’s [2012] contention that it is 
permissible in these cases for the agent to choose any available act.) 
In contrast, it is easy to construct an idealized experimental resolution of  Death in Damascus that is suitable for 
studying decision-theory efficacy. If  Death’s reliability is nearly perfect, then nearly all decision makers end up 
dead regardless of  their decision-making theory. The idealized experimental resolution of  Death in 
Damascus suitable for studying decision-theory efficacy, therefore, does not support any theory. However, 
in the asymmetric variant, all decision makers end up dead, but some end up dead and spend their last day 
in a less pleasant location. Thus, from the perspective of  decision-theory efficacy, we want a theory that 
recommends the more pleasant location. 
Similar points concerning decision-theory efficacy apply to Ahmed’s [2014a] variant in which the agent is 
offered the chance to pay $1 to base their decision on the flip of  an indeterministic coin, which Death 
cannot predict. As Ahmed [2014a, 589] points out, half  of  those who purchase the coin survive, while 
nearly all of  those who do not die. Therefore, from the perspective of  decision-theory efficacy, we want a 
decision theory that recommends paying. 
 
2.3 Further Applications 
We have seen how the experimental approach applies to the classic and transparent versions of  Newcomb’s 
problem. Let us now apply it to the medical Newcomb problem and in elucidating the difference between 
idealized and non-idealized decision theory. 
 
2.3.1 Medical Newcomb Problems 
Here is Andy Egan’s [2007, 94] version of  the medical Newcomb problem: 
 
The Smoking Lesion 
Susan is debating whether or not to smoke. She believes that smoking is strongly correlated with 
lung cancer, but only because there is a common cause—a condition that tends to cause both 
smoking and cancer. Once we fix the presence or absence of  this condition, there is no additional 
correlation between smoking and cancer. Susan prefers smoking without cancer to not smoking 
without cancer, and she prefers smoking with cancer to not smoking with cancer. Should Susan 
smoke? 
It seems clear that Susan should smoke, but why? According to nonexperimental approaches to decision 
theory, the answer is that smoking is more intuitive, or that smoking is supported by a set of  axioms that 
are more intuitive than those that support not smoking. The experimentalist has a better answer. 
The description of  the case makes clear that Susan takes her current decisions to have no causal effect on 
the formation of  the lesion. Susan also believes that her decision theory has no causal effect (at any point) on 
the formation of  the lesion (otherwise, this would be a classic Newcomb problem and not a medical one). We 
incorporate this information into the idealized experimental resolution of  the decision problem. In the idealized 
experimental resolution, the formation of  the lesion is determined by an independent process that results in a 
percentage of  the population forming the lesion. (To assume otherwise would be to allow Susan’s belief  
inaccuracy to affect the dependent variable, exactly the sort of  the effect that we hope to remove in idealized 
decision theory). When we analyze the case given this assumption, we infer that adjustments to the decision 
Susan makes or the decision theory she employs have no causal effect on the development of  cancer. Rather, 
changes to these variables only result in changes to Susan’s pleasure in smoking. 
Refraining from smoking, and any decision theory which recommends doing so, are thus irrational. Contrary 
                                                             
However, it is less clear that paying is causally act efficacious. This is because, at least prima facie, the causal 
consequences of  traveling to Damascus (Aleppo) after viewing the coin are the same as the causal 
consequences of  traveling to Damascus (Aleppo) without viewing the coin—except for the lost $1. Those 
committed to the idea that paying for the coin is rational may therefore need to deny that rationality is 
determined by causal act efficacy. 
A possible response on behalf  of  CDT would dispute Ahmed’s characterization of  the alternatives. Ahmed 
imagines the alternatives to be i) go to Damascus, ii) go to Aleppo, or iii) pay to flip the coin. But 
according to Joyce [2012], deliberation about whether to choose Damascus or Aleppo results in a “tie,” 
and either is permissible. The agent must therefore engage some sort of  tiebreaking procedure. Thus, the 
agent’s available alternatives ultimately are i) engaging a deterministic tiebreaking procedure which outputs 
Damascus or Aleppo, or ii) paying $1 to engage an indeterministic tiebreaking procedure which outputs 
Damascus or Aleppo. CDT recommends (ii) because that has a lower chance of  outputting Death’s 
location. The same treatment would then need to be used to amend Lewis’ [1981a, 29–30] proposed 
solution to the Hunter-Richter problem. 
to standard methodology, refraining from smoking is not irrational because it is directly or indirectly unintuitive, 
but because it is efficacious in preventing smoking pleasure and not cancer. These effects can all be observed, 
in principle, in the idealized experimental resolution of  The Smoking Lesion. 
 
2.3.2 Difference between Idealized and Non-Idealized Decision Theory 
Not all of  decision theory employs idealizing conditions. There is research into non-idealized decision theory, 
typified by the work of  Pollock [2006] and Weirich [2004]. On the experimental approach, we can neatly 
distinguish idealized and non-idealized decision theory, and in a way that respects the idea that both types of  
theories are studying the same concept of  rationality.18 
Idealized decision theory attempts to control for effects of  limitations in the agent’s epistemic perspective 
in determining the efficacy of  acts or decision theories. Thus, for idealized decision theory, cognitive limitations 
and inadequate time for calculation represent confounding variables that should be controlled for in an 
experimental resolution. In contrast, non-idealized decision theory attempts to determine efficacy without 
controlling for these factors. Thus, for non-idealized decision theory, cognitive limitations and inadequate time 
for calculation are the conditions under which efficacy is to be determined. In short, on the experimental 
approach, both idealized and non-idealized decision theory study efficacy, but under different experimental resolutions. 
For example, when studying the efficacy of  decision theories under time limitations, a non-idealized 
experimental resolution would stipulate a set of  decision problems, the cognitive abilities of  the agent, and a 
time limit for calculating decisions. Then, various decision theories would be evaluated as the independent 
variable. The theories that produce the best weighted average of  success—in relation to the decision problems, 
cognitive ability, and time limit—are the better theories. 
When studying the efficacy of  acts, rather than decision theories, the distinction between idealized and non-
idealized decision theory is less clear. While the weighted average of  success produced by a decision theory depends 
on the agent’s cognitive abilities and calculation time, that produced by an act does not. An act produces the 
same results whatever process is used to select it. Therefore, the “best act” for a non-idealized agent with 
cognitive limitations and time constraints matches the best act for an idealized agent. 
The experimental approach to non-idealized decision theory, therefore, focuses on decision theories as the 
independent variable, not acts. In the next section, we explore reasons to adopt decision theories as the 
independent variable for idealized decision theory. A positive upshot of  doing so would be the creation of  an 
even more unified research program for studying rational decision making. 
 
3 Decision Theories as the Independent Variable in Idealized Decision Theory 
In some contexts it is best to study the efficacy of  acts and in others that of  decision theories. In this section, I 
explain the motivation for thinking of  decision theories as the appropriate object of  study for determining 
decision-making rationality in idealized decision theory (e.g., in determining whether it is rational to one- or 
two-box), and I discuss the sorts of  theories that follow. 
                                                             
18Non-idealized decision theory is often thought to take inspiration from the “bounded rationality” idea, but 
this can be misleading. In fact, Pollock and Weirich see themselves as studying decision-making rationality 
in “realistic” situations, not as studying a different type of  rationality. Weirich [2004, 6] explains: “A 
standard of  bounded rationality does not introduce a new concept of  rationality but rather applies the 
usual concept in cases where idealizing assumptions are relaxed and agents face obstacles such as a 
shortage of  time for reaching a decision.” 
 
3.1 Why Study the Efficacy of  Decision Theories when Determining Rationality? 
Clearly an agent’s physical and cognitive abilities, false beliefs, and bad luck can prevent her from attaining her 
goals, but it is odd to regard her rationality as a further hindrance. Instead, we might think that if  we specify the 
goals and eliminate all differences in abilities, beliefs, and luck, then the decision makers that tend to do best are 
those who are most rational. This, anyway, is my construal of  the best general motivation behind success-first 
decision theories, especially those of  Gauthier [1986] and McClennen [1990]. 
Nevertheless, even if  it is odd to regard practical rationality as a hindrance, this is exactly what it must be if  
we identify rational decision making by determining the efficacy of  acts. There are many cases, like Newcomb’s 
problem, where those employing a decision-making theory that recommends  the most efficacious acts leads to 
bad results (in comparison to the results of  employing certain other decision-making theories). These cases 
often involve—as in Newcomb’s problem—predictions of  an agent’s choices. 
One might respond that here the predictor is “rewarding for irrationality.” Sometimes the remarks of  
Gibbard and Harper [1981, 181] and Lewis [1981b, 377] are interpreted in this way. However, I interpret them 
as claiming merely that the predictor rewards for a predicted one-box decision, which is irrational, rather than 
claiming that the predictor is “rewarding for” irrationality. The latter claim, after all, is false. The reward 
condition in Newcomb’s problem is not a prediction of  irrationality (a case with this reward condition would 
be very different from Newcomb’s problem). Rather, the reward condition is a prediction of  one-boxing. Since 
two-boxing is the causally efficacious act, those who think rationality is determined by the causal efficacy of  
acts should just accept that rational agents end up worse off, without attempting to soften the blow by appealing 
to the false claim that the predictor’s reward condition is irrationality.19 If, on the contrary, one is inclined to 
reject a decision theory because it leads agents to disaster (under idealizing conditions), then the way to do that 
is to study the efficacy of  decision theories.20 The ultimate justification for this perspective is that decision 
theories are the proper independent variable. 
 
 
3.2 Appropriate Experimental Resolutions 
As we saw in Section 2, a strength of  the experimental approach is that it makes clear the value of  identifying 
suitable idealizing conditions when studying idealized decision theory. One obvious idealizing condition is belief  
accuracy. It would be absurd to demand that idealized decision theories perform well despite belief  inaccuracy. 
This would be like demanding that a flu treatment cure patients when they mistakenly believe that they have the 
flu. As discussed in Section 2, the effects of  belief  inaccuracy should be controlled for by studying experimental 
                                                             
19Cases involving an infinite number of  decisions, such as Arntzenius et al.’s [2004, 262] Satan’s Apple, provide 
non-prediction examples in which employing a decision-making theory that recommends always choosing 
the most causally efficacious acts leads to bad results. Arntzenius et al.’s [2004, 267] suggestion that such 
agents are being “punished for” their inability to self-bind is just as problematic as the claim that agents in 
Newcomb’s problem are being punished for their rationality. As Meacham [2010] points out, decision 
problems are individuated partly by the acts available, and thus cases in which binding acts are available are 
simply different decision problems. Cases like Satan’s Apple represent a problem for agents who employ 
causal act-efficacy decision theories precisely because each act on the road to disaster is optimally efficacious. 
They have this feature by design. If, on a metatheoretic level, one cares only about the causal efficacy of  acts, 
then there is no puzzle to be solved: one should grant that such agents are led to disaster. 
20 Presumably, even supporters of  focusing on act efficacy like Arntzenius et al. [2004] feel some of  this 
impulse, or they would not attempt to blame the causal decision theorists' disasters on their inability to self-
bind. 
resolutions where agents’ credences match objective chances. 
The other obvious idealizing condition is unbounded cognitive processing. Idealized decision theory 
determines what agents should do when they are not facing processing constraints. Accordingly, such constraints 
should be controlled for in experimental resolutions of  decision problems. To include effects of  such constraints 
in experimental resolutions would be to engage in non-idealized decision theory. 
The last restriction on appropriate experimental resolutions that I will discuss is theory-extensionality. (I will 
not refer to this as an “idealizing condition” because it seems to be important for almost all forms of  non-
idealized decision theory as well.) An experimental resolution is theory-extensional when the conditions under 
which an agent is rewarded or punished do not essentially reference the decision-making theory that the agent 
employs. Otherwise, it is theory-intensional. Almost all decision problems studied by decision theorists yield 
theory-extensional experimental resolutions. Even decision problems that seem theory-intensional are actually 
theory-extensional. Newcomb’s problem is an example. The reward condition in the experimental resolution of  
Newcomb’s problem is a prediction of  one-boxing by a reliable predictor. To say that the predictor is reliable is 
exactly to specify a high chance of  a one/two-box prediction when one/two-boxing will in fact occur. What 
matters for the reward condition is the predicted one-boxing; the reward condition makes no essential reference 
to the decision-making theory that the agent employs. 
A theory-intensional resolution would be one where the reward condition is, for example, being an evidential 
decision theorist. This sort of  case is far less interesting, and is not relevant when determining the efficacy of  
decision theories. Theory-intensional resolutions in which agents are punished for employing certain decision 
theories are similarly irrelevant when determining efficacy. For example, the fact that a demon might kill those 
who employ CDT is not a mark against the efficacy of  the theory. To think otherwise would be like denying 
the efficacy of  a flu treatment because it is outperformed by a placebo when all and only the patients receiving 
the treatment are poisoned. 
It remains an open question whether, within idealized decision theory, any decision theory has optimal 
efficacy across all appropriate experimental resolutions. I suspect that there are no such theories, and thus that 
there is symmetry between the study of  act- and decision-theory efficacy (since it is also true that no acts are 
necessarily efficacious). On the experimental approach, the necessary truths need not concern efficacy but 
rather evaluation. The act experimentalist claims: “necessarily, the rational act is contingently optimally 
efficacious within the resolution” The decision-theory experimentalist claims: “necessarily, the rational act is 
recommended by a contingently optimally efficacious decision theory within the resolution.” 
To sum up, there are at least three conditions for appropriate idealized experimental resolutions of  decision 
problems: belief  accuracy, unbounded cognitive processing, and theory-extensionality. If  decision-theory 
efficacy determines rationality, then a decision theory is a better guide to rationality to the extent that it 
outperforms others relative to the experimental resolutions being studied. 
 
3.3 Success-First Decision Theories 
CDT attempts to isolate causal consequences of  acts, while causal success-first decision theory attempts to 
isolate causal consequences of  decision theories. Hypothetical experiments should, in each instance, aim to 
capture all the effects of  the independent variable on the dependent variable, and so the experiment “starts” at 
a point in which all the effects of  the independent variable can be considered. 
In the case of  act efficacy, this is the point an action can be performed, and potential consequences of  
available acts are measured from then forward. In imagining the experiment, we hold everything constant that 
is causally independent of  the acts (or evidentially independent, if  using the evidential experimental approach 
discussed in Section 2.1) in order to avoid confounding variables. Similarly, for decision-theory efficacy, the 
experiment starts at the point when a decision theory can be adopted, and potential consequences of  the 
available acts are measured from then forward. 
On the causal experimentalist approach, there exist Newcomb-like prediction problems in which it is 
impossible for the decision theory that an agent employs to causally influence the dependent variable, because, 
for example, the prediction occurs before the agent was born. When we study experimental resolutions like that, 
we are not studying decision-theory efficacy, but rather the efficacy of  something else. We might, for example, 
be studying the causal efficacy of  an agent generator, not of  the agent itself. In some contexts, this is a fascinating 
question, but it is not the study of  the resulting agents’ decision-making rationality. 
In the rest of  this section, I evaluate the potential object-level success-first decision theories mentioned in 
the introduction. Armed with the experimental approach, we will be able to better appreciate the degree to 
which existing success-first decision theories succeed, and to formulate a plausible way to perfect them. 
 
3.3.1 Gauthier’s “Constrained Maximizer” 
Gauthier’s [1986] “constrained maximizer” is an agent that is disposed to consider not simply which acts 
maximize expected utility in the present, but also which acts it would have maximized expected utility to plan 
on choosing in the past. In much of  Morals by Agreement, Gauthier’s discussion exclusively concerns strategic 
interaction between bargaining partners, but he provides a generalization of  his basic idea that covers decision 
making more generally. He proposes the following: 
 
Gauthier’s Proposal: if  at some time t0 it maximizes expected utility to follow a plan that involves A-ing 
at some subsequent time t1, then the agent should A at t1. [1986, 1988/89]  
 
I have taken a few liberties with Gauthier’s proposal in light of  the discussion above. In Morals by Agreement, 
Gauthier’s formulation is in terms of  an agent’s dispositions to act. He claims that if  it is rational to adopt a 
decision-making disposition then it is rational to subsequently act in accordance with that disposition. 
Formulating the theory in terms of  dispositions raises problems beyond the ones discussed here.21 
In Newcomb’s problem, there is divergence between the best act in the present and the best plan in the past. 
At any time before the prediction is made, it would maximize expected utility to follow a one-boxing plan. 
Therefore, if  we set t0 to a time prior to prediction, Gauthier’s proposal would recommend one-boxing. 
However, two-boxing is recommended if  t0 occurs after the prediction. Thus, if  Gauthier’s proposal is to give a 
different recommendation than straightforward maximization in Newcomb’s problem, the point at which plans 
are evaluated must not be in this post-prediction region. But as it stands the proposal leaves the point of  
evaluation for the utility of  plans unspecified. We therefore turn to suggestions for specifying this point. 
3.3.2 McClennen’s “Resolute Chooser” 
One suggestion is to tie evaluation of  the utility of  plans to actual commitments or “resolutions” made by the 
agent. This is McClennen’s [1990] proposal. When one of  McClennen’s “resolute choosers” determines that 
plan p is utility maximizing, she resolves to follow p. When subsequently faced with a decision, the agent ends 
                                                             
21For a discussion of  some of  the problems of  the disposition formulation, see Smith, 1991. It should be 
noted that in his later work Gauthier [1993] retreated from this proposal. His later view is that it is only 
rational to follow a plan at t1 if  by so acting one is better off  than one would be had one never committed to the plan at 
all. This theory retains causal efficacy in Newcomb-like problems that involve “assurances.” However, it is 
causally inefficacious in Newcomb-like problems that involve “threats.” 
up “intentionally choosing to act on that resolve” by choosing the act specified by p [McClennen, 1990, 15]. I 
suggest that for our purposes it is best to discard references to psychological aspects of  “resolve,” and focus on 
how McClennen’s proposal amounts to an alternative to standard decision theory. In this spirit, we can imagine 
that a “resolution” manifests in an agent dropping a temporal anchor when she recognizes a utility-maximizing 
plan. In the future, when the agent faces a decision, the utility-maximizing status of  the action at the time of  
the anchor dictates what to do. So, in Newcomb’s problem, a resolute chooser who is temporally located before 
the prediction may see that a one-boxing plan has greater expected utility than a two-boxing plan. She resolves 
to one-box, thus dropping the anchor. When the decision arrives, resolute choice recommends one-boxing due 
to the utility-maximizing status of  one-boxing at the time of  the anchor. 
McClennen’s proposal makes clear the past point from which plans are to be evaluated, and it does sometimes 
create better payouts in Newcomb problems than those received by causal decision theorists. However, 
McClennen’s resolute choice gives the same recommendations as CDT in situations where agents are not 
forewarned of  predictions. This is the case in the classic Newcomb problem, where it is commonly assumed 
that the agent does not know of  the prediction until offered the choice. The agent thus has no opportunity to 
make a resolution, and without a prior resolution, McClennen’s theory recommends  two-boxing. This is part 
of  a general pattern: decision rules that require an actual pre-commitment will in some cases be less success-
conducive than one that allows for merely hypothetical pre-commitments [Andreou, 2008, 415–22]. In other 
words, any theory that requires that an agent actually “resolve,” “intend,” or otherwise “commit” to a plan may 
fail if  the agent is not forewarned of  impending predictions. 
3.3.3 Meacham’s “Cohesive Decision Theorist” 
To solve this problem with McClennen’s formulation, a theory needs to focus on hypothetical rather than actual 
commitments. Such a theory is formulated by Meacham [2010, 68–9], in an attempt to advise agents to choose 
actions that they would have bound themselves to choose. According to Meacham’s “cohesive decision theory,” 
agents should make decisions according to the “comprehensive strategy” (a function that maps every decision 
problem to one of  its available acts) they would choose for themselves from the perspective of  their “initial 
credence function.” Meacham imagines that such agents would maximize “cohesive expected utility”: 
 
CoEU(CS) = ∑iic(wi:CS)u(wi)  
 
Where “ic” is the agent’s initial credences and “CS” is a comprehensive strategy for selecting acts given decision 
problems. Meacham uses “:” as a neutral connective between strategies and worlds, leaving open whether this 
should be understood causally or evidentially. Meacham’s formulation of  expected utility builds on the standard 
formulation [i.e., EU(A) = ∑icr(wi:A)u(wi)] by giving control to the agent’s initial credences rather than her 
current credences, and by evaluating plans (“comprehensive strategies”) instead of  acts. As Meacham [2010, 69, 
fn. 33] notes, we might understand these initial credences as the agent’s “ur-priors.” 
Meacham [2010, 69] explains that a specification of  cohesive decision theory with the “standard form” would 
rely on an agent’s current credences about her initial credences: 
 
CoEU(CS) = ∑icr(ici)∑jici(wj:CS)u(wj)  
 
Where “cr(ic)” is the agent’s current credences about her initial credences. 
Under the experimental approach, we should immediately apply two Newcomb tests when considering the 
efficacy of  cohesive decision theory. The first, as revealed in Section 2.1, is that a theory should recommend 
one-boxing in the classic Newcomb problem. The second, as revealed in Section 2.3.1, is that the theory should 
recommend the two-boxing equivalent in medical Newcomb problems. These represent two of  the most basic 
measures when testing a success-first decision theory. 
For cohesive decision theory to pass the second test, we must interpret “:” as recommended by CDT. 
Otherwise, the theory will fail to recommend the two-boxing equivalent in medical Newcomb problems. Thus, 
the connection between comprehensive strategies and worlds must be spelled out by the agent’s causal 
dependency hypothesis, and more precisely, the agent’s ur-causal dependency hypothesis (more precisely still, by the 
agent’s current credences about the agent’s ur-causal dependency hypothesis). Doing so will satisfy the medical 
Newcomb problem requirement. For example, as we saw in The Smoking Lesion, in the idealized experimental 
resolution the decision to refrain from smoking is efficacious only in preventing smoking pleasure, not in 
preventing cancer. The same is true of  a nonsmoking plan from the ur-priors. This allows cohesive decision 
theory to pass the second test, but it prevents it from passing the first. 
Appealing to ur-causal dependency hypotheses is a cumbersome way to attempt to produce a one-box 
recommendation in the classic Newcomb problem, and it is unclear that it succeeds. For example, consider a 
Newcomb’s problem in which the prediction takes place on July 1st, 2017 at noon. Now consider which 
comprehensive strategy would maximize causal expected utility from the ur-priors. If  the prediction has already 
occurred, then a two-boxing strategy is most efficacious; whereas, if  the prediction has not occurred, then a 
one-boxing strategy is most efficacious. Whether it is better to “bind” oneself  to a one- or two-boxing strategy 
thus depends on where the agent is in time—from the ur-priors, the agent asks, “Am I located before or after 
noon on July 1st, 2017?” 
Giving control to the ur-priors is like stripping away the agent’s evidence, and it is difficult to think about 
the probabilities an agent would assign to locations in time if  she had no evidence whatsoever. However, given 
that the best strategy for the causalist in Newcomb problems crucially depends on these probabilities, we must 
find some way to determine them if  cohesive decision theory is to produce a recommendation. These credences 
seem vague or impossible to specify.22 This problem might be solved by a new form of  success-first decision 
theory—the “functional decision theory” of  Soares and Levinstein [manuscript] and Soares and Yudkowsky 
[manuscript]—which does not focus on causation and time but rather logical counterfactuals regarding the 
output of  the agent’s decision function.23 
                                                             
22  Even if  we grant the possibility of  determinate locational probabilities from the ur-priors, the 
recommendations of  cohesive decision theory would still fall far short of  an optimally efficacious decision 
theory. From the ur-priors, presumably, the probability that an agent is located prior to the prediction is the sum 
of  the probabilities of  the possible locations prior to noon on July 1st, 2017. If  the probability of  being in this 
region falls below a certain threshold (e.g., .001 in the classic Newcomb problem if  the predictor has near-
perfect reliability), then cohesive decision theory recommends two-boxing. We can lower the probability 
threshold by imagining that the prediction occurs nearer to the beginning of  the total possible days that an agent 
could be located, or by lessening the difference between the money in the transparent box and the potential 
reward in the opaque box. These changes affect what cohesive decision theory recommends, even though the 
causal efficacy of  employing a decision theory that recommends one-boxing remains optimal. 
23 The motivations for functional decision theory seem to align perfectly with cohesive decision theory. 
Soares and Yudkowsky [manuscript, 9] write: “Pre-commitment requires foresight and planning, and 
can require the expenditure of  resources—relying on ad-hoc pre-commitments to increase one’s 
expected utility is inelegant, expensive, and impractical...FDT agents simply act as they would have 
ideally pre-committed to act.” Whether functional decision theory makes good on this claim is best 
To sum up, the experimental approach to studying the efficacy of  decision theories provides a backdrop 
from which to evaluate the success-first decision theories of  Gauthier, McClennen, and Meacham. Their 
analyses go astray but are moving in the right direction. The justification of  a success-first decision theory, I 
suggested, is not to be located, precisely, in its “cohesiveness,” in its being an “asset” rather than a “liability,” or 
related notions. Rather, success-first decision theories succeed exactly when they produce the best average 
payout in appropriate experimental resolutions of  decision problems. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has presented an experimental approach to decision theory, which is compatible with the general 
aims of  both CDT and EDT. When evaluating causal efficacy, we should use decision-theoretic experiments to 
isolate the causal consequences of  acts or decision theories. For the causal experimentalist, the disagreement 
between one- and two-boxing in Newcomb’s problem lies in a disagreement over the appropriate independent 
variable for decision-theoretic experiments. In line with CDT, two-boxing is supported when acts serve as the 
independent variable. In line with success-first decision theory, one-boxing is supported when decision theories 
serve as the independent variable. Several success-first decision theories have been evaluated using the causal 
experimental approach, and none has been found entirely satisfactory, though the potential for research seems 
bright. Ultimately, the goal for success-first decision theories is maximization of  success in appropriate 
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